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ABSTRACT
Despite many attempts, the state-of-the-art of adversarial machine
learning onmalware detection systems generally yield unexecutable
samples. In this work, we set out to examine the robustness of
visualization-based malware detection system against adversar-
ial examples (AEs) that not only are able to fool the model, but
also maintain the executability of the original input. As such, we
first investigate the application of existing off-the-shelf adversarial
attack approaches on malware detection systems through which
we found that those approaches do not necessarily maintain the
functionality of the original inputs. Therefore, we proposed an
approach to generate adversarial examples, COPYCAT, which is
specifically designed for malware detection systems considering
two main goals; achieving a high misclassification rate and main-
taining the executability and functionality of the original input.
We designed two main configurations for COPYCAT, namely AE
padding and sample injection. While the first configuration results
in untargeted misclassification attacks, the sample injection con-
figuration is able to force the model to generate a targeted output,
which is highly desirable in the malware attribution setting. We
evaluate the performance of COPYCAT through an extensive set
of experiments on two malware datasets, and report that we were
able to generate adversarial samples that are misclassified at a rate
of 98.9% and 96.5% with Windows and IoT binary datasets, respec-
tively, outperforming the misclassification rates in the literature.
Most importantly, we report that those AEs were executable un-
like AEs generated by off-the-shelf approaches. Our transferability
study demonstrates that the generated AEs through our proposed
method can be generalized to other models.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the threat of malicious software (malware) is growing rapidly,
malware detection is becoming a higher priority within the com-
puter security research community and software security industry
alike. To address this threat, there has been a wide variety of re-
search works presenting various techniques for detection, using
signatures [1], static analysis [2], and dynamic analysis [3]. Al-
though these methods are powerful in analyzing malware, they
have multiple shortcomings, such as their limited scalability [4].
The static analysis based approach to malware detection is inef-
fective, since it is prone to obfuscation. Dynamic analysis, while
addressing obfuscation by observing actual behavior of malware
at the execution time, is often resources-intensive, and subject to
dynamic analysis evasion (e.g., sandbox detection), making it insuf-
ficient alone. Those shortcomings and the need for an automation
technique that extrapolates insight into software from features of
behavior have opened a new avenue for malware analysis through
visualization, often incorporated into automatic malware detection
techniques that often use machine and deep learning [5–8].
Visualization has been leveraged over both shallow and deep
learning algorithms, and in many security applications, including
computer forensics [9], network monitoring [10], and software se-
curity [6–8]. In malware analysis of visualization techniques, hard-
to-analyze code information is transformed into an image, where
features of different executable files are visualized. Compared to
conventional methods, including those mentioned above, the de-
tection process using visualization is simpler and faster (analogous
to static analysis), due to the viability of deep learning approaches
in recognizing patterns, even over obfuscated code [11]. Moreover,
the utilization of visualization techniques along with deep learning
models has been shown to improve the performance of malware
detection in multiple ways: reduced time and memory consump-
tion, improved robustness and detection accuracy, and being non-
intrusive [6, 12–14]. To this end, several studies have incorporated
deep learning-based networks for detecting malicious executable
files from benign ones using visualization techniques [15, 16].
Although applications of deep learning models are actively ex-
plored in a wide range of applications, e.g., health-care, industry,
and cyber-security [17, 18], deep learning itself has been shown to
be vulnerable to Adversarial Examples (AEs) [19, 20]. AEs, which
are carefully crafted inputs, are created by adding a small perturba-
tion to the original input of a machine learning algorithm in order
to produce the adversaries’ desirable outputs, such as misclassifica-
tion [21, 22]. Since the crafted samples are generated by applying
limited changes on the original inputs, the crafted samples are very
similar to the original ones, and are not necessarily outside of the
training data manifold. Algorithms crafting adversarial samples
are designed to minimize the perturbation, thus making it hard to
distinguish adversarial samples from legitimate ones.
Shortcomings of the Prior Work. There has been several stud-
ies, some of which are concurrent to this work, which have several
shortcomings which we outline here and address in the subsequent
sections. Most importantly, while generating adversarial samples, it
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
09
73
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
0 S
ep
 20
19
Aminollah Khormali, Ahmed Abusnaina, Songqing Chen, DaeHun Nyang, and Aziz Mohaisen
is important to ensure executability of the resulting samples (code),
a common shortcoming of the prior work. Liu et al. [23] presented ad-
versarial attacks on machine learning-based malware visualization
detection methods, although they considered the entire sample as
a candidate for perturbation, corrupting the adversarial sample’s
code. Of note in this direction of generating adversarial samples
while not corrupting the sample is the seminal work of Grosse et al.
[13], who investigated adversarial attacks on neural network based
android malware detection models. In their work, perturbations
were added into malware’s none functional parts. Their approach
achieved a misclassification rate of 63% over all malware samples,
which is—although promising—quite low. Moreover, although their
method maintains the functionality of the code, it does not nec-
essarily maintain its executability, since changing the application
manifest will affect the permissions, software and hardware com-
ponents access, intents, etc., which are necessary for the malicious
applications to execute the code by the correct API calls.
Although adversarial learning has been an active research area,
and outside of the aforementioned works, there is very little re-
search done on understanding the impact of adversarial attacks
on deep learning-based malware detection [13, 24, 25], particularly
those utilizing visualization. In parallel to our work, the authors of
[24, 25] suggested injection of a sequence of bytes for AE genera-
tion. Our work differs in multiple points. First, our work tackles
the visualization-based malware detection approach, which has
been proven to be faster and more efficient as a malware detection
method [13, 14]. Second, we investigate the targeted misclassifica-
tion attacks, in addition to untargeted misclassification which was
the focus of the work in [24, 25]. Third, we explore and confirm the
generalization of the proposed method by evaluating it using two
malware datasets, Windows and IoT binaries, and transferability to
other algorithms. Finally, we explore the performance of a defense
method, adversarial training, on the detection of the generated
adversarial malware examples.
Contributions.Motivated by the aforementioned issues, our main
goal is generating adversarial malware samples that (1) fool the classi-
fier and (2) execute as intended. First, we investigate the executability
of the adversarial examples generated by leveraging adversarial
attack methods into deep learning-based malware visualization de-
tection systems. In particular, we explore multiple well-established
adversarial attack methods with the visualization-based approach
to generate adversarial samples with least L2-distance from origi-
nal input for both attacks and defenses. We find that although the
generated adversarial examples can successfully fool the classifier,
none of them is still executable. Therefore, we further propose
COPYCAT, which operates by padding binaries of a certain class
into the binaries of another label, to maintain the executability
of the original input, while forcing the model to act as desired
by the adversary, with targeted and untargeted misclassification.
Specifically, the contributions are:
• We investigate the application of five generic adversarial meth-
ods for attacking visualization-based deep learning models for
the malware detection. We find that although these methods out-
perform state-of-the-art in their evasion rate, the generated AEs
do not necessarily maintain the executability of the files. We con-
clude that those adversarial learning algorithms are impractical
candidates for understanding the robustness of such detectors.
• Given the shortcomings of those off-the-shelf adversarial algo-
rithms for generating practical malware samples that evade de-
tectors, we propose a new approach, called COPYCAT, which
is specifically designed for generating executable samples, in
order to maximize the attack success rate while maintaining the
functionality and executability of the original files.
• We conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the per-
formance of COPYCAT for generating adversarial executable
samples under both targeted and untargeted attacks settings. In
particular, we have designed and evaluated various configura-
tions of COPYCAT using two malware datasets, for Windows and
IoT, demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed approach
in generating executable AEs. COPYCAT is shown to have a
misclassification rate of 98.9% and 96.5% on Windows and IoT
malware datasets, respectively, and all of the AEs are executable.
Organization. In section 2 we provide a brief background. We
describe COPYCAT in section 3, and follow it with performance
evaluation and discussion in section 4. We review the related work
in section 5. Finally, limitations and future work are discussed
in section 6, followed by the conclusion in section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
We incorporate malware visualization from the computer-vision
community, and the deep learning algorithms and adversarial at-
tacks from the artificial intelligence community into a single process
for generating adversarial malware samples. In this section, we de-
scribe some background information and basic models. First, we
need to transform malware binaries into images from which fea-
tures are extracted, as described in section 2.2. In section 2.3, we
describe the high-level idea of the adversarial machine learning
and its importance in the domain of deep learning-based malware
detection systems. We note that we will provide more technical
details of AEs generation methods in section 3.1. Finally, we discuss
potential defenses against AEs in section 2.4.
2.1 Deep learning-based Malware Detection
In COPYCAT, and as a baseline, we design a deep learning-based
classifier based on the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) ar-
chitecture. CNNs are a type of deep, feed-forward artificial neural
networks, widely used for image classification tasks [26, 27]. Deep
learning models offer several advantages compared to traditional
machine learning algorithms. For example, they extract and learn
representative features automatically, which in turnmeans that they
require minimal pre-processing effort compared to traditional ma-
chine learningmethods where features have to be extracted through
feature-engineering algorithms using domain knowledge [28].
We designed two CNN models, one for each dataset, with three
consecutive convolutional layers with ReLu activation, followed by
a fully connected layer outputting softmax function values for each
class. We tested different values for the number of convolutional
layers, batch size, and epochs to improve the classification accuracy
of the model over test samples of the two malware datasets. For the
Windows-based malware binaries we achieved 99.12% accuracy rate
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after 50-epoch training and batch size of 150. Similarly, we trained
another CNN model with the same architecture for IoT malware
binaries and achieved 99.67% accuracy rate on test samples after
50-epoch training and a batch size of 150. More detailed information
about convolutional neural networks can be found in [26].
2.2 Visualization
The different sections of code containing specific information about
the software (malware) can be converted and organized as a two-
dimensional array of unsigned integers, which is then transformed
into a grayscale image. Recently, various visualization methods [6,
12, 29] have been proposed to analyze malware using this idea. The
main goal of malware visualization techniques is conversion of
hard-to-identify code information into an image, and acceleration
of malware detection process [30]. The visualization process starts
reading the malware samples as 8-bit unsigned integer vector, and
categorizing it into set of two-dimensional array. The values in the
array are transformed into a range of 0 and 255 that represents
a grayscale image. The pixels corresponding to 0 result in black
pixels while 255 result in white pixels. It is worth noting that the
images’ width is determined and fixed based on the characteristics
of the dataset, while the height of the image can change based on
the size of the malware sample. The output of the visualization
step would be images with the same width and probably different
heights. However, before applying the learning algorithm, we need
re-scale the images to a fixed width and height.
Illustration. A high-level flowchart of the malware visualization
process is illustrated in Figure 1. In this process, each malware
binary is first converted into an 8-bit vector and then transformed
into a grayscale image with a fixed width ofw1 (vector to matrix
conversion). The height of the image depends on the original mal-
ware size. However, the re-scaled images of all binaries are all of
the same width and height, where w1 and w2 are equal while h1
and h2 are not necessarily equal.
We note that each binary file consists of various sections, such as
.text, .rdata, .data, .rsrc [31]. The .text section contains the
executable code, the .data section includes both uninitialized code
and initialized data, while the .rsrc section contains all resources
of the module. All sections are combined to construct the image
corresponding to the binary, and four different samples from our be-
nign and malware samples are visually illustrated in Figure 2, where
2(a) and 2(b) show benign and malicious Windows binaries, while
2(c) and 2(d) show benign and malicious IoT binaries, respectively.
As seen in Figure 2 different fragments of benign and malware
samples represent unique image textures, which are leveraged in
the deep learning model to detect malicious binaries [32].
2.3 Attacks in Deep Learning (Threat Model)
The main goal of the attacks against deep learning is to modify an
input sample x such that it is misclassified by the model f , where
it has been shown that an attacker is able to craft AEs, e.g., x ′, by
applying a small perturbation to the original input such that the
model is forced to produce an output of the attacker’s choice [33–
35]. Adversarial learning attacks on deep learning models can be
categorized from multiple point of view, and based on the adver-
sary’s goals and capabilities [36], as highlighted in the following.
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Figure 1: High-level flowchart of the visualization process.
Notew1 = w2, while not necessarily the case for h1 and h2.
(a) Win. ben. (b) Win. mal. (c) IoT ben. (d) IoT mal.
Figure 2: Sample visualization of benign andmalicious bina-
ries. Here, 2(a) and 2(b) showbenign andmaliciousWindows
binaries, respectively.While, benign andmalicious IoT bina-
ries are shown in 2(c) and 2(d), respectively.
2.3.1 Goals. The goal of the adversary in deep learning is to force
the model into incorrect results. The main goal of the adversary
can be represented based on the nature of the incorrectness.
• Confidence reduction. The goal is to reduce the classifier’s con-
fidence, by presenting ambiguity in the predictions of the model.
This attack does not necessarily result in incorrect outputs.
• Untargetedmisclassification. Producing adversarial examples,
e.g., x ′, that force the model output f (.) to be any class other
than the original one; this is, f (x ′) ̸= f (x ).
• Targetedmisclassification. Crafting adversarial examples, e.g.,
x ′, that force f (.) to be any specific class f (x ′) = t . Note that this
type of attack is more complex than the confidence reduction
and the untargeted misclassification attacks.
2.3.2 Capabilities. Considering attacks conducted at the test time,
the adversarial attacks can be categorized based on the information
and capabilities made available to the adversary into white-box
attacks and black-box attacks.
• Model architecture and training data. The adversary has full
knowledge and access to the training data x and the deep learning
model f used for classification, including the training functions
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and algorithms, the number and type of layers, neurons’ activa-
tion functions, link weights and bias, loss, etc.
• Model architecture In this work we assume that the adversary
has full knowledge about the model architecture and associated
activation functions, the number of layers, link weights, bias, etc.
• Training data In this work we assume that the adversary builds
a new deep learning model based on his collected dataset that
is representative of the original dataset in both characteristics
and distribution. Note that the adversary has no information
regarding the original model and its properties.
• Oracle The adversary has an oracle access to the model and no
prior knowledge about the architecture and its internals. More-
over, we assume that the adversary can learn about the relation-
ship between supplied inputs and the corresponding output of
the model through rate limited/unlimited queries.
• Sample Here the adversary is able to collect pairs of inputs and
outputs associated with an unknown deep learning model. How-
ever, the adversary cannot change the input value to investigate
its impact on the model output. Therefore, it is only practical
when large number of samples are available.
2.3.3 Our Threat Model. In this work we designed two sets of
configurations for COPYCAT depending on the utilized approach.
Namely, while the AE padding approach assumes that the adver-
sary has full knowledge of the topology of the model, the link
weights, etc., the sample injection configuration is a black-box at-
tack. Moreover, we assume that the adversary’s goal is to conduct
both targeted and untargeted attacks. Based on that, part of this
study falls into the standard white-box attack model, while the
other part falls into black-box attack model.
2.4 Robustness
Both shallow and deep learning models play a critical role in detect-
ing malicious applications and analyzing sequential streams of data.
Therefore, several defenses have been proposed to increase the
robustness of such models against adversarial learning attacks [37].
The ultimate goal for defensive techniques is making the decision
based on meaningful features, and more immune to changes in fea-
tures that are less important [37]. Adversarial training is the most
common defensive technique, and is implemented by training the
model over the original data and the generated adversarial exam-
ples from different attack methods. This defense technique ensures
better accuracy against such attacks, but while lowering the origi-
nal accuracy due to the change in classification paradigm [37, 38].
Some extensions to adversarial training were implemented to im-
prove the classification accuracy, including the virtual adversarial
training using smoothing and LDS gradient, by Miyato et al. [39],
and ensemble adversarial training, which improves the quality of
adversary training sample, by Tramer et al. [40]. Transfer learning
techniques, such as distillation, were used by Papernot et al. [21],
to improve the robustness of the aforementioned approach.
3 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES
There are several studies that incorporate deep learning-based clas-
sifiers for detectingmalicious binaries from benign ones. In addition,
it has been shown that deep learning models are not immune to
adversarial attacks, and can be easily fooled. Although the concept
of adversarial machine learning is an active research area, there
are very few research works that have investigated the impact of
adversarial attacks on the deep learning-based malware detection
systems [23]. Therefore, the key goals of our study is to investi-
gate the impact of adversarial attacks on the performance of deep
learning-based malware detector, as well as generating adversar-
ial malware samples that are executable. In particular, we aim to
generate adversarial samples that can fool the deep learning model
such that malware binaries are classified as benign, and vice versa.
To do so, we design three different configurations: an adversarial
attack configuration, a defense configuration, and an executability
configuration. The first configuration utilizes several existing at-
tack methods—previously unexplored for this problem domain—to
generate adversarial binary samples. The second configuration ex-
plores potential defense strategies to increase the robustness of deep
learning-based malware detectors against adversarial examples. In
the executability configuration, we focus on generating adversarial
samples that are not only successful in fooling the classifier, but
also are executable. In the following, we will describe step-by-step
aspect of these configurations.
3.1 Generic Adversarial Attacks
To investigate off-the-shelf adversarial attacks on malware detec-
tion, we utilized five generic algorithms capable of generating AEs.
The primary goal of this configuration is to generate AEs that suc-
cessfully fool the traditional visualization-based malware detection
designed using deep learning networks. This attack configuration
consists of two modules, the traditional visualization-based mal-
ware detection system (① in Figure 3) and adversarial example
generator module (② in Figure 3), reviewed in the following.
3.1.1 Visualization-based Malware Detection System. This module
consists of a visualization and deep learning sub-modules. The visu-
alization sub-module transforms the binary code of each (potential)
malware sample into a grayscale image, while the deep learning
sub-module, which is based on a convolutional neural network
with multiple layers, is designed and trained on a training set of
grayscale images and evaluated using the test images for tuning.
Note that this model builds the baseline model for malware detec-
tion, which will be mainly used for adversarial binary generation
in the subsequent modules.
3.1.2 Adversarial Example Generator. The main responsibility of
this module is to create AEs using off-the-shelf adversarial machine
learning algorithms. The adversarial sample generator module,
shown in Figure 3 takes the trained model and test set of grayscale
images as inputs and generates adversarial binaries using one of
five different algorithms: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM),
due to Goodfellow et al. [41], Carlini and Wagner method (C&W),
due to Carlini and Wagner [33], DeepFool, due to Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [19], Momentum Iterative Method (MIM), due to Dong et
al. [42], and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), due to Madry et
al. [38]. We briefly describe each attack method in Appendix A.
3.1.3 Shortcomings. This attack configuration assumes the avail-
ability of an intermediary state, rather than the malware binary,
where binaries are already transformed into grayscale images (visu-
alized) accessible by the adversary, and the adversary tries to force
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Figure 3: General structure of the visualization-based generic adversarial attacks. As shown, it consists of three modules. Mod-
ule 1 is for the visualization-based malware detector, module 2 is for generating adversarial samples based on generic adver-
sarial learning algorithms. Note that the AEs generated at module 2 are not necessarily executable. Thus, to maintain the
executability of the crafted AE, the generated AEs from 2 are being appended to the original test images in the third module.
the trained DL model into misclassification. While this constitutes
a major shortcoming of this configuration, it is not the only one:
another shortcoming is that the generated AEs in this configuration
are not guaranteed to be executable since the applied perturbation
into the grayscale image may result in corrupted binary code.
In conclusion, this configuration is well-suited to cases where
the detection design is based on the visualization approach alone,
where malware binary code are readily transformed into grayscale
images. This configuration, however, will not be effective with end-
to-end detection (i.e., where the detector starts with the binary, does
the transformation via visualization, then learning and detection).
3.2 Defense Configuration
The goal of the defense is to improve the robustness of the mal-
ware detection system against AEs. Although there are multiple
defensive algorithms against AEs, such as defensive distillation [21]
and adversarial training [41, 43, 44], none of them is completely
effective. Nonetheless, in this study we utilized adversarial training
to improve the robustness of our malware detection system, as it is
the most successful adversarially robust model so far [37]. The basic
idea of adversarial training is to inject AEs into the training proce-
dure to increase the robustness of the model [37], where the goal is
to solve the following adversarial empirical risk minimization:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D˜ [maxδϵS L(x + δ ,y;θ )] ,
where x is the input image, y is the model output, θ is the model
parameters, and δ is a small perturbation.
The steps taken to defend against the adversarial samples are
shown in algorithm 1. The algorithm takes Datasetorд , Labels , and
CNNtr as inputs, generates adversarial samples against CNNtr
using the previous five attacking methods and train a new method
over the combination of the original dataset and generated adver-
sary examples. Each sample in the original dataset will be repre-
sented with additional five adversary samples each from different
attack. This will increase the robustness of the model as the decision
will be related to the core features that preserve the information,
rather than being affected by the change of features that is not
fundamentally meaningful [37], which may lead to overfitting.
3.3 COPYCAT
In a nutshell, generating adversarial samples while affecting the
executability of the application is counter-intuitive, and is an easy
way to infer whether a piece of software is malicious or benign
(by attempting to execute it). Moreover, altering a malware sample
while not paying attention to modifications in the malicious piece
of code (by, for example, overriding it), while may fool the classifier,
goes against the whole point of adversarial example generation
from a practical standpoint. Therefore, we propose two approaches
to generate samples that 1) fool the classifier, and 2) maintain the
executability of the original binary (malicious or benign).
The key idea in this work is inspired by the work of Cha et
al.’s [45], where binaries of an application specified by a certain ar-
chitecture are padded into an application from another architecture
to change the behavior and application logic depending on the sys-
tem used for running it. As such, we consider the machine learning
model as an additional system on which a sample needs to operate,
along with the actual system on which the binary will run, and
customize our sample to operate successfully on both as intended.
Note that, and unlike the work of Cha et al.’s [45], our program
sizes do not need to be identical in size: we have the advantage of
constructing a sample of a minimal size only to fool the classifier,
while not altering the actual sample for a guaranteed executability.
Executable Adversarial Examples. COPYCAT contributes two meth-
ods for executable adversarial samples generation:
• AE Padding. Our first method is called “AE Padding”, in which
COPYCAT generates an AE x ′ for an original sample x using
one of the five previous attack methods. Then, we convert x ′ to
an adversarial image with the same dimensions of the original
sample image, and append the adversarial image to the end of the
original sample image. Appending pixels at the end is equivalent
to appending the code into a non-reachable code area, which
will not affect the executability of the program but will change
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Algorithm 1: Sample algorithm for adversarial training as a de-
fence against adversarial attacks. Here, the model (Mo ) trained
over the original dataset (Do ) and the corresponding labels
(Lo ) are inputs of the function (AdvTraininд) and adversarially
robust model (Ma ) is its output.
1 Function AdvTraining (Do, Lo, Mo );
Input :Do , Lo ,Mo
Output :MA
2 Dt ← Do
3 Lt ← L
4 for attack IN adversary_attacks do
5 AEs ← attack .дenerate (Mo )
6 Dt ← Dt ∪AEs
7 Lt ← Lt ∪ Lo
8 end
9 MA ← New Model
10 MA.train(Dt , Lt )
11 returnMA
the output pattern of the visualization, and likely leading to a
misclassification (which needs to be confirmed). The general ar-
chitecture of this configuration of COPYCAT is shown in Figure 3,
where the third module in ③ is responsible for appending AEs,
generated in②, to the end of the original sample image. Note that
the appended images were not necessarily executable, whereas
the output of the third module is executable.
• Sample Injection. The second method is called “Sample Injec-
tion”, inwhichwe inject the binaries of a sample from the targeted
class into an unreachable area of the binaries (code) of the at-
tacked sample, usually at the end of the code. This process will
ensure the executability of the original binary while changing the
pattern of the visualization, leading to a model misclassification.
ConcurentWork. Two other concurrent studies [24, 25] proposed
similar approaches to ours. However, unlike those concurrent stud-
ies which produced untargeted misclassification attacks, COPYCAT
produces both targeted and untargetted misclassification. In other
word, COPYCAT can force the model to label the original input as
any other desired class. This is a particularly important objective
in malware family classification applications, since classification,
for example, is used for attribution, designing the correct remedies,
and risk management procedures, etc. Moreover, although a mi-
nor contribution, we explored and confirmed that our approach
generalized equally well to IoT malware. Moreover, we show that
COPYCAT is able to achieve an untargeted misclassification rate of
98.90%, compared to the untargetted classification results of 60% in
the concurrent published work [24]. Finally, COPYCAT was able
to achieve a targeted misclassification rate of 73.50% and 96.5% for
Windows and IoT samples, respectively, which are promising. We
use a CNNmodel with a general architecture that can accommodate
multiple types of malware, unlike MalConv [24].
4 EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
We evaluate the performance of COPYCAT for generating exe-
cutable AEs through comprehensive experiments. To do so, we
Table 1: Family-level distribution of Windows malware.
Malware Family Number of Samples# %1
Ramnit 1,534 13.14%
Lollipop 2,470 21.15%
Kelihos ver3 2,942 25.19%
Vundo 451 3.86%
Simda 41 0.35%
Tracur 685 5.87%
Kelihos ver1 386 3.30%
Obfuscator.ACY 1,158 9.91%
Gatak 1,011 8.65%
Benign Sample 1,000 8.56%
Total 11,678 100%
assume that the adversary aims to conduct both targeted and un-
targeted attacks, with white-box access to the model. We evaluate
the performance of COPYCAT against two set of datasets, namely
Windows and IoT binaries. In the following, we review the datasets,
the experimental setup, the results and finding, and a discussion.
4.1 Dataset
We used two datasets: Microsoft Windows malware binaries and
Internet of Things malware binaries. We used those two types of
malware for the following reason. First, while Windows malware
is popular, IoT malware is on the rise, and deserves consideration
in evaluations. Second, because machine learning algorithms out-
comes depend on the used dataset, having multiple datasets would
be better than one. Finally, we note that no prior work used such
emerging IoT malware dataset, although our work can be easily
applied to other malicious binaries, such as Android applications
as well. To this end, in the following we review the used datasets.
• Windows Malware Binaries. To carry out our experiment
on representative Windows malware samples and facilitate re-
producibility of results, we used open source malware dataset,
called BIG 2015. BIG 2015 is introduced in the Kaggle Microsoft
Malware Classification Challenge [32]. The dataset consists of
10,678 labeled malware samples classified into nine different mal-
ware families, and 1,000 benign samples randomly selected from
valid executables of Windows 10 binaries. Table 1 shows the
distribution of the samples across the nine malware families.
• IoT Malware Binaries.We select IoT malware for their preva-
lence, as they are very popular for the increasing use of IoT
devices, their flexibility (Linux applications) and portability (de-
veloped for multiple platforms). For our IoT binaries, we obtained
a set of 2,899 randomly selected IoT malware samples in binary
format from the IoTPOT project [46]. In addition, we collected a
set of 207 benign IoT binaries, for a total of 3,106 IoT binaries.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the malware samples across
families, the variety in malware IoT samples helps with creating
more robust models exposed to more patterns and behaviors which
increases the decision confidence of the classifier. Table 3 shows
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Table 2: Distribution of IoT malware samples across fami-
lies (labels assigned by antivirus scanners). %1 refers to the
representation of families among malware samples.
Arch Number of Malware# %1
Gafgyt 2,609 89.99%
Mirai 185 6.38%
Tsunami 67 2.32%
Singleton 32 1.10%
Hajime 6 0.21%
Total 2,899 100%
Table 3: IoT dataset: malware and benign binaries.
Label Number of Samples# %1
Benign 207 6.66%
Malware 2899 93.34%
Total 3,106 100%
the labels used in the training process of the DL model, summing
up the number of benign and malicious samples outlined above.
4.2 Experimental Setup
For a transparent evaluation, in the following we describe the ex-
perimental setup we use for generating the adversarial examples.
• Algorithms implementation. All attack methods are imple-
mented using Cleverhans [47], a python library with state-of-
the-art implementations for various adversarial methods.
• Parameters. Each attack method has different parameters. We
conducted several experiments with different values for such
parameters to achieve a high misclassification rate. For exam-
ple, DeepFool has two parameters to be tuned, the overshooting
value and the number of iterations, which were tuned to 100 and
0.05, respectively, to achieve 96.43% accuracy with the Windows
malware model. The parameters of each attack method are re-
ported in Table 4 (for both datasets), while the obtained results
for other attack methods are reported in Table 5 and Table 6 for
the Windows and IoT datasets, respectively.
• Evaluation system.All experiments are conducted using Python
3.6 running over Ubuntu 16.04 and using a system of i5-8500 CPU
operating at 3.00GHz, with 32GB DDR4 RAM, 512GB SSD, and
NVIDIA GTX980 Ti graphical processor unit (GPU).
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
We use three evaluation metrics: the mislcassification rate (MR),
perturbation magnitude (PM), and running time (RT). MR is used
as an indication of the success rate for fooling the detection system.
When the predicted label argmaxk P (yk |x¯i ) for the adversarial sam-
ple x¯i is not same as the correct class label yi of the original sample
Table 4: Parameters used for each adversarial attack meth-
ods. Here ϵ refers to the distortion parameter, L.R. refers to
learning rate, # Iter. refers to the number of iterations, andO.
refers to overshooting parameter in DeepFool method. The
sign (–)means the parameter is not applicable to themethod.
Method ϵ # Iter. L.R. O.
FGSM 0.3 - - -
C&W - 100 0.1 -
DeepFool - 100 - 0.05
PGD 0.3 250 - -
MIM 0.3 250 - -
xi , this results in misclassification, and the rate is calculated as:
1
n
∑
i
I (argmax
k
P (yk |x¯i ) ̸= yi ).
We use Lp , which measures the PM by p–norm distance as:
∥δ ∥p =
(
n∑
i=1
∥x¯i − xi ∥p
) 1
p
Forp–norm, studying the L0, L2 and L∞ is very common [33]. In this
study, we measure the count of changes in the adversarial example
compared to the original sample and L2 distance of the adversarial
example and the original one. Note that these two metrics indicate
magnitude of the perturbations. Finally, we measure the running
time (RT) required to generate adversarial examples (in seconds) as
a metric to compare the complexity of various attacks.
4.4 Results and Discussion
In order to provide better perspective of our findings, by following
the main key contributions highlighted in our methodology, this
section is broken down into attack configuration (section 4.4.1),
defense configuration (section 4.4.2), and executable configuration
(section 4.4.3). For each of these configurations, we discuss the
results for both of theMicrosoftWindows and IoTmalware datasets.
4.4.1 Generic Attacks Configuration. Our main goal is to generate
adversarial samples that are able to fool the DL-based malware
detector. Note that this configuration is based on applying the
perturbations on the images generated from malware binaries, thus
there is no guarantee regarding the executability of the crafted AEs.
Windows. We generate adversarial examples using five generic
adversarial attack methods mentioned in section 3.1. Table 5 shows
the results for the different attack methods in terms of misclassifi-
cation rate, perturbation magnitude, and running time. As shown
in Table 5, PGD achieved the highest misclassification rate of 99.63%,
while perturbing 89.14% of the pixels. However, PGD is expensive
in term of its running time. On the other hand, FGSM and C&W are
the top two methods with the lowest running times, while reaching
reasonable misclassification rate of 99.08% and 99.45%, respectively.
One interesting observation from Table 5 is that all of these
generic adversarial attack algorithms change a huge portion of
the original image’s pixels (e.g., more than 71%), which in turn
correspond to parts of the original binaries. Thus, it can be easily
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Table 5: Generating adversarial examples forWindows bina-
ries using generic adversarial attack methods.
Method MR (%) Pixels L2 Dist. RT (s)# %
FGSM 99.08 8,594 83.92 25.86 112.10
PGD 99.63 9,128 89.14 23.11 1,339.60
C&W 99.45 7,316 71.44 4.09 2,071
MIM 99.54 8,732 85.27 25.08 6,875
DeepFool 99.45 7,750 75.68 3.23 15,545.70
Table 6: Generating adversarial examples for IoT binaries us-
ing different adversarial attack methods
Method MR (%) Pixels L2 Dist. RT (s)# %
PGD 100 9,452 92.30 23.36 3,979.80
FGSM 93.19 9,558 93.33 26.98 51
C&W 100 8,932 87.22 2.44 975.30
MIM 100 9,296 90.78 24.77 3,926.50
DeepFool 100 9,258 90.41 3.68 1,798.10
expected that the applied perturbation on the grayscale images may
result in a corrupted binary that will not be executable.
IoT. The same set of attacks and evaluation metrics as in sec-
tion 4.4.1 are applied on the IoTPOT dataset. As such, the results
with the IoTPOT dataset are shown in Table 6. As shown, we can
observe that all adversarial attack methods achieved a misclassifi-
cation rate of 100%, except for the FGSM method. Here the C&W
method is shown to outperform other methods considering the L2
distance between the generated AEs and original inputs, although
with a larger number of changed pixels. In particular, we notice that
the number of changed pixels varies from 87.22% in C&W to 93.33%
in the FGSM approach. The huge number of changed pixels in the
generic adversarial approaches may make the crafted adversarial
binaries unexecutable, which is not desirable in effective evasion
techniques for software (that is supposed to be executed).
Executability. We note all adversarial examples resulting from
both malware datasets, using all methods above were unexecutable.
4.4.2 Defense Configuration. Defense configuration aims to im-
prove the robustness of the DL-based malware detection systems
against various generic adversarial attack methods.
Windows. We implement the adversarial training method to in-
crease the robustness of the DL-based malware detector against
generic adversarial attack methods. To do so, we trained a model us-
ing the original inputs and the corresponding adversarial examples,
which were generated using the aforementioned generic algorithms.
The misclassification rates before and after the adversarial training
for all adversarial attack methods are shown in Table 7. As it can be
seen from Table 7, training over adversarial examples improves the
robustness of the neural network against adversarial learning at-
tacks. For instance, the evasion rate has dropped significantly from
99.08% into 8.68% (which is more than 90% improvement on the
robustness of the model) for FGSM in Windows binaries after ad-
versarial training. We observe similar pattern for other adversarial
attack approaches.
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Figure 4:Misclassification rate of benign executable files due
to appended malicious adversarial samples. We found that
the misclassification rate is highly correlated with the # of
distorted pixels and the L2 distance.
Table 7: Misclassification rate on Windows and IoT before
and after applying adversarial training. * indicates to the
misclassification rate after applying adversarial training.
Method Misclassification (%) Misclassification* (%)Windows IoT Windows IoT
FGSM 99.08 93.19 8.68 0.80
C&W 99.45 100 26.12 15.76
DeepFool 99.45 100 83.24 97.43
PGD 99.63 100 27.80 5.47
MIM 99.54 100 77.76 4.98
IoT.We implement the same defense for the IoT malware detector
by training a model on the IoT dataset and generating the corre-
sponding adversarial examples. The misclassification rate before
and after adversarial training for all adversarial attack methods are
shown in Table 7. As it can be seen from Table 7, training over ad-
versarial examples improves the robustness of the neural network
against the adversarial learning attacks. For instance, the robustness
of the DL-based IoT malware detection system has improved more
than 99% for the FGSM approach in IoT binaries after adversarial
training. The same pattern is observed for other methods.
4.4.3 COPYCAT. The results of our proposed approach, COPY-
CAT, for generating executable adversarial binaries are reported
as followed.Windows. In this paper, we introduced AE padding
and sample injection. Figure 4 shows the results of the AE padding
method, by appending the adversary example, generated using
generic adversarial atatck methods, to the binaries of the origi-
nal executable sample. As it can be seen, we achieved the highest
misclassification of 79.9% using MIM as our adversarial example
generator. Table 8 and Table 13 show the results of the sample
injection method, by injecting benign sample binaries at the end
of malware sample binaries (M2B), and vice versa (B2M)—when
we inject a benign sample into a malware sample we are in fact
converting a malware sample into a benign sample (M2B). In the
first case, we achieved an overall misclassification rate of 98.9%,
while the misclassification rate of M2B was 73.5% by injecting a
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benign sample with 4.4MB size. In the second case, we achieve a
misclassification rate of B2M (regardless of the class) of 98.6% with
a malware sample of size 11.5MB.
IoT.We show results for the sample injection method, which con-
sists of injecting benign binaries into malware and vice versa. Ta-
ble 9 shows the results of injecting benign binaries into malware
samples, by using a benign sample of size 11.5MB, we achieve a
misclassification of 96.5%. Whereas Table 10 shows the results of
injecting malware binaries into benign samples, achieving a mis-
classification accuracy of 95.65% using a malware of size 2.4MB.
Executability. All adversarial examples that resulted from both
malware datasets, using the two methods above, were executable.
4.5 Generalization with Transferability
To investigate the generalization of the generated adversarial bina-
ries using COPYCAT, several experiments are conducted. To do so,
we train another DL model with the following network structure:
we use three consecutive fully connected layers of size 64 connected
to the input vector, followed by a dropout with a probability of 0.5.
Similarly, the output of the dropout function is fully connected
with another softmax dense layer. Throughout our experiments we
found that the injection of malware samples can force this Deep
Neural Network (DNN)-based model to misclassification, with a
similar performance to that of the CNN-based malware detection
system. The results of the benign-to-malware misclassification at-
tack are shown in Table 11, where it is concluded that the generated
adversarial binaries are general, and can be used to possibly fool
other models with different structures. For instance, the sample
injection configuration of COPYCAT is able to force the DNN-based
malware detection system to misclassify benign samples to mali-
cious with a varying misclassification rate from 78.21% to 100%
for samples injected with size of 2.2MB and 11.5MB, respectively.
In addition, we found that the injection of a benign sample into a
malicious sample can result in an evasion rate of up to 89.28% in a
DNN-based malware detection system, as the detailed results are
shown in Table 15.
We also observed a similar set of results for the IoT dataset, as
shown in Table 12 and Table 14 for benign and malicious sample
injection, respectively. For example, we were able to achieve a
misclassification rate of 80% and 97.58% by injecting a benign and
malicious file, respectively, in DNN-based IoT malware detection.
4.6 Size Trade-off
Injection method’s outcomes (misclassification) depend on the size
of the injected sample, due to the behavior of NN in general. Neural
networks are well known for recognizing patterns, and increasing
the size of the injected sample will increase the portion of sample’s
pattern against the overall layout. In general, a larger injected
sample results in a higher effect on misclassification.
The attacks discussed in section 4.4.1 do not guarantee the exe-
cutablity of the generated sample, as each pixel in the visualization
corresponds to some of the data in the original sample. Changing
one bit (or pixel) may corrupt the sample, leading to unexecutable
adversarial example. Our proposed methods preserve the function-
ality and executability by padding data into unreachable point of
the application, which is usually after the exit code. These methods
will not affect the application in any way except by increasing its
size, which we consider as a trade-off cost of executability.
5 RELATEDWORK
Machine and deep learning algorithms for malware detection have
been actively pursued. For example, malware visualization is a
technique that transforms binaries into images, which are then
used to build machine/deep learning-based malware detection sys-
tems [29, 30]. Cui et al. [15] introduced a malware detection method
using deep learning, and by transferring the malicious code into
grayscale images. They achieved an accuracy rate of 94.5% on the
Vision Research Lab dataset [48], claiming better accuracy rate
and execution time compared to static [2] and dynamic feature
analysis [4]. Similarly, Ni et al. [49] proposed a malware detection
system, called MCSC, that is build over 10805 grayscale images con-
sisting of nine different malware families. Su et al. [14] presented
a lightweight IoT malware classifier that works based on visual-
ization and CNN model, and achieves a detection rate of 94% over
goodware and DDoS malware classification tasks [50]. Fu et al. [16]
presented a fine-grained malware detector, through RF, KNN, and
SVM models, that was trained over colored images generated from
malware binaries. Their method was able to achieve a malware de-
tection accuracy rate of 97.47%, and family classification accuracy
rate of 96.85% using random forest model. Moreover, Fan et al. [51]
presented a Metagraph2vec based malware detection system. Hou
et al. [52] investigated android malware detection system based on
structured heterogeneous information network.
Arp et al. [53] presented a light-weight method, DREBIN, for
detecting malicious android applications based onmachine learning
models trained over features extracted from static analysis. McDer-
mott et al. [54] introduced a Mirai detector based on deep learning,
which could distinguish Mirai botnet traffic from normal IoT IP
camera traffic with 99% accuracy. Pajouh et al. [55] explored the
potential of using recurrent neural networks to detect ARM-based
IoT malware, achieving detection accuracy of 98.18% using LSTM
structures to analyze OpCode sequences. Furthermore, Wang et
al. [56] proposed an adversary resistant neural network with an
application to malware detection based on feature nullification.
Although addressing a different problem, and using a different
approach, COPYCAT is inspired in part by Cha et al.’s [45], where
they propose the idea of platform-independent programs. Moreover,
the approach in this work is in line with although concurrent to
the work of Kolosnjaji et al. [24] and kreuk et al. [25]. However,
COPYCAT is different in multiple aspects, as highlighted earlier; e.g.
performing both untargeted and targeted misclassification, tack-
ling the visualization-based malware detection approach, providing
higher evasion rate, and targeting both windows and IoT malware.
We claim that COPYCAT is able to acheive high attack success rate
while generating executable adversarial binaries, unlike the work
of Liu et al. [23], where the main focus is maximizing the transfer-
ability regardless of the executability of the generated binaries.
6 LIMITATION AND FUTUREWORK
We have explored two methods to generate adversarial examples
that fool the visualization-based malware detection system, while
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Table 8: Size vs. MR of
B2M (Windows)
Malware size MR(%)
0.82 MB 82.1
1.10 MB 88.5
2.20 MB 96.4
11.50 MB 98.6
Table 9: Size vs. MR of
M2B (IoT).
Benign size MR (%)
1.0 MB 67.5
1.9 MB 76.7
3.6 MB 95.5
11.5 MB 96.5
Table 10: Size vs. MR of
B2M (IoT).
Malware size MR (%)
256 KB 56.50
553 KB 92.27
1.1 MB 95.17
2.4 MB 95.65
Table 11: Transferability:
Size vs. MR of B2M (Win).
Malware size MR(%)
0.82 MB 90.09
1.10 MB 94.06
2.20 MB 78.21
11.50 MB 100
Table 12: Transferability
of M2B (IoT).
Benign size MR (%)
1.0 MB 56.00
1.9 MB 70.50
3.6 MB 36.75
11.5 MB 80.00
Table 13: Size vs. MR of M2B and overall (Windows).
Benign Size Misclassification (%)Overall Benign
1.2 MB 76.2 56.1
1.4 MB 90.2 37.8
3.5 MB 89.3 63.0
4.4 MB 98.9 73.5
Table 14: Transferability:
Size vs. MR of B2M (IoT).
Malware size MR (%)
256 KB 85.02
553 KB 82.60
1.1 MB 95.17
2.4 MB 97.58
Table 15: Transferability: Size vs. MR
of M2B and overall (Windows).
Benign Size Transferability (%)Overall Benign
1.2 MB 37.5 23.7
1.4 MB 72.4 18.1
3.5 MB 66.0 42.3
4.4 MB 89.3 34.4
preserving executability and functionality of the binaries. How-
ever, both of the proposed methods require appending data into
the original sample. Generalizing this over multi-class classifiers,
requires padding of at least one AE of each target class to ensure
targeted misclassification. For example, to support a 10-class classi-
fier would require multiplying the size of the original sample by
approximately 10 times. This, in turn, constitutes the main short-
coming of the AE padding method. In addition, our results indicate
that the performance of the sample injection method positively
correlates with the size of the injected sample. Furthermore, the
adversarial training method depends on the injected AEs similar
to the ones used by the adversary, which may not be the case in
practice. It is computationally expensive and almost impossible to
find adversarial inputs by all attack models, which results in that
the adversarial training is not-adaptive to unknown attacks.
7 CONCLUSION
Recent research shows that deep learning is vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples, whereby an adversary can manipulate the input
of a deep learning model in such an unnoticeable way by adding
minimal perturbation to the input to generate a desired output,
i.e., misclassification. In this work, we have studied several generic
adversarial attacking methods and incorporated them into deep
learning malware detection, showing a great success in fooling clas-
sifiers. To allow misclassification while maintaining executability,
a shortcoming of state-of-the-art, we proposed AE padding and
sample injection, two new adversarial methods to manipulate the
output of the deep model while guaranteeing the functionality and
executability of the generated sample. By designing three configu-
rations; an adversarial attack configuration, a defense configuration
and an executability configuration, we have evaluated the perfor-
mance of the proposed attacks through extensive experiments. The
executable configuration is capable of generating adversarial ex-
amples that successfully force the deep learning-based model to
a misclassification rate of 98.9% and 96.5% on Windows and IoT
malware datasets, respectively, while preserving executability and
maintaining the same functionality of the original malware.
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A APPENDIX
This section provides further information regarding adversarial
learning algorithms utilized in this study and their categorization
based on adversary’s goal and knowledge.
Aminollah Khormali, Ahmed Abusnaina, Songqing Chen, DaeHun Nyang, and Aziz Mohaisen
A.1 Adversarial Learning Algorithms
In this study, we utilized five generic adversarial attack methods
to generate visualized AEs. A brief description of these algorithms
are provided in the following, and we refer more interested readers
to the original works.
A.1.1 Fast Sign Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM is a fast
method designed to generate adversarial examples without guaran-
teeing similarity of the generated examples, when compared to the
original samples [41]. FGSM works based on a one-step gradient
update, which can be expressed using:
δ = ϵ · siдn (∇x Jθ (x , l)) , (1)
where δ is the perturbation parameter, ϵ is a small scalar value that
limits the distortion of the image and sets the magnitude of the
perturbation. Moreover, siдn(.) denotes the sign function, J (.) is the
cost function, where x is the input image and l is the label associated
with it, and ∇ computes the gradient of the cost function J around
the current value of x . Finally, the output adversarial image is by:
x ′ = x + δ , (2)
where x ′ is the adversarial example corresponding to image x . Con-
trolling the distortion parameter ϵ will affect the L2 norm distance
between the original and the adversarial examples. A higher ϵ value
corresponds to a larger L2 distance. For visualization, x ′ values are
clipped to fit into [0-255] channel scale [14].
A.1.2 Carlini & Wagner (C&W) Method. Carlini and Wagner [33]
introduced three gradient based attacks by optimizing the penalty
and distance metrics on L∞, L2, and L0 norms in the process of
generating adversarial examples, as follows:
min | |δ | |2p : д (x + δ ) = y′ & x + δ ∈ X , (3)
where δ is the perturbation parameter, д(.) is the objective function
based on the hinge loss,y′ is the targeted class, and x is the input im-
age. This method ensures that the added perturbation will be small
and only as required to misclassify to class y′. A small modification
can be made to launch non-targeted attacks by computing:
min | |δ | |2p : д (x + δ ) ̸= y & x + δ ∈ X . (4)
In this work, we focus on the L2-based C&W attack to generate ad-
versarial examples. The L2 distance represents the required changes
into the binaries to generate the adversarial example, where a lower
L2 distance corresponds to a smaller perturbation in the binary to
generate the example. The perturbation δ is defined by:
δ = 12 (tanh (w) + 1) − x , (5)
where tanh(.) is the hyperbolic tangent function, andw is an auxil-
iary variable optimized by:
min
w
| | 12 (tanh (w) + 1) | |2+c · д
(
1
2 (tanh (w) + 1)
)
, (6)
where c is a constant. The C&W method minimizes the Lp norm
distance between the generated adversary example and the original
image to increase the similarity and harden the detection process.
A.1.3 DeepFool Method. DeepFool is originally designed to be
untargeted iterative attack based on the L2 distance metric [19]. It
views the neural network as a linear structure, where each class is
separated with a hyperplane. To generate an adversarial example,
DeepFool increases the distance per iteration between the input
and the class associated with that input. The class is defined by:
kˆ(x ) = arдk max fk (x ), (7)
where fk (x ) is the output of the objective function corresponding
to class k , which represents the class with the highest probability.
Assuming that f (x ) is an affine classifier represented by:
f (x ) =WT x + b, (8)
then the perturbation needed to misclassify input x is described by:
arдr min | |r | |2 s .t . ∃k : wTk (x0 + r )+bk ≥ wTkˆ (x0) (x0 + r )+bkˆ (x0),
(9)
where wk is mapped to the kth column ofW . To generalize this
method for multi-class non-linear structure, we find the next closest
class to the input x using the following:
lˆ (x0) = arд min
k ̸=kˆ (x0)
| fk (x0) − fkˆ (x0) (x0) |
| |wk −wkˆ (x0) | |2
. (10)
By finding the minimum perturbation needed to misclassify the
model using (11), we generate the AE using x ′ = x + r∗.
r∗ (x0) =
| flˆ (x0) (x0) − fkˆ(x0) (x0) |
| |wlˆ (x0) −wkˆ (x0) | |
2
2
(
wlˆ (x0) −wkˆ (x0)
)
. (11)
A.1.4 Momentum Iterative Method. Momentum iterative method
(MIM) is based on applying momentum gradient over basic FGSM
to generate adversarial examples [42], the main goal is to maintain
efficiency against black boxmodels. Themain object for this method
is to find x ′ that misclassify the model that satisfy the equation (12)
where J is the loss function, and ϵ is small scalar that control the
maximum distortion allowed.
arд max
x ′
J
(
x ′,y
)
, s .t . | |x ′ − x | |∞≤ ϵ (12)
The momentum gradient (Mд ) then calculated using (13).
Mдt+1 = µMдt +
∇x Jθ
(
x ′t , l
)
| |∇x Jθ
(
x ′t , l
) | | (13)
where µ is the decay factor. Initially, x ′0 is the original input, andMд0
is 0. Each iteration, x ′ will be updated according to this equation:
x ′t+1 = x
′
t + ϵ · siдn
(
Mдt + 1
)
(14)
after n number of iterations, the x ′t+1 will be returned as the adver-
sarial example for input x .
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A.1.5 PGD Method. Madry et al. introduced an iterative projected
gradient descent (PGD) attack [38]. The aim of PGD is to generate
an adversarial sample under a minimized empirical risk with a trade
of high performance cost. The original empirical risk minimization
(ERM) for the model defined by:
E(x,y)∼D [L (x ,y,θ )], (15)
where L is the loss function. By modifying the definition of ERM
and allowing the adversary to perturb the input, S is described in:
min
θ
ρ (θ ) : ρ (θ ) = E(x,y)∼D [max
δ ∈S
L (x + δ ,y,θ )], (16)
where δ is the perturbation, and ρ (θ ) is the objective function to
minimize. As an iterative method, x ′t+1 is updated each iteration
according to the previous x ′t and the generated perturbation, after
n iterations, x ′t+1 will be returned as the adversarial sample. Our
goal with PGD is to minimize the risk while adding perturbation in
order to generate the adversarial example.
